A prompt injection vulnerability paired with other flaws can turn a Google search into a full attack chain that could threaten enterprise networks.
Researchers map full org chart of the scam from dodgy recruiters to helpful Western collaborators Researchers at IBM X‑Force and Flare Research have uncovered data that sheds light on how North Korea's fake IT worker schemes operate and infiltrate companies in order to funnel money back to the regime and steal sensitive information.…
The suspected India-linked threat group targets governments, telecom, and critical infrastructure using spear-phishing, old vulnerabilities, and rapidly rotating infrastructure to maintain persistent access.
Tracking pixels let social media companies spy on their users even after they click over to advertiser sites, gleaning credit card info, geolocations, and more, according to an analysis.
No 1 Space Operations Squadron will get a persistent stare capability The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plans to spend £17.5 million on a remotely-operated satellite monitoring facility in Cyprus, partly to protect the UK's secure communications system Skynet.…
CISA is aware of malicious cyber activity targeting endpoint management systems of U.S. organizations based on the March 11, 2026 cyberattack against U.S.-based medical technology firm Stryker Corporation, which affected their Microsoft environment.1 To defend against similar malicious cyber activity, CISA urges organizations to harden endpoint management system configurations using the recommendations and resources provided in this alert. CISA is conducting enhanced coordination with federal partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to identify additional threats and determine mitigation actions. To defend against similar malicious activity that misuses legitimate endpoint management software, CISA urges organizations to implement Microsoft’s newly released best practices for securing Microsoft Intune; the principles of these recommendations can be applied to Intune and more broadly to other endpoint management software: Use principles of least privilege when designing administrative roles. Leverage Microsoft Intune’s role-based access control (RBAC) to assign the minimum permissions necessary to each role for completing day-to-day operations—permissions include what actions the role can take, and what users and devices it can apply that action to. Enforce phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) and privileged access hygiene. Use Microsoft Entra ID capabilities (including Conditional Access, MFA, risk signals, and privileged access controls) to block unauthorized access to privileged actions in Microsoft Intune. Configure access policies to require Multi Admin Approval in Microsoft Intune. Set up policies that require a second administrative account’s approval to allow changes to sensitive or high-impact actions (such as device wiping), applications, scripts, RBAC, configurations, etc. Additionally, CISA recommends reviewing the following resources to strengthen defenses against similar malicious cyber activity: Microsoft resources: For recommendations on securing Microsoft Intune, see Best practices for securing Microsoft Intune. For guidance on implementing Multi Admin Approval in Microsoft Intune, see Use Access policies to implement Multi Admin Approval. For recommendations on configuring Microsoft Intune using zero trust principles, see Configure Microsoft Intune for increased security. For guidance on implementing Microsoft Intune RBAC policies, see Role-based access control (RBAC) with Microsoft Intune. For guidance on deploying Privileged Identity Management (PIM) across Microsoft Intune, Entra ID, and other Microsoft software, see Plan a Privileged Identity Management deployment. CISA resources: For guidance on implementing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), see Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA. Disclaimer The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA does not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA. Acknowledgements Microsoft and Stryker contributed to this alert. Notes 1 For updates from Stryker on the incident, see “Customer Updates: Stryker Network Disruption,” Stryker, last modified March 15, 2026, https://www.stryker.com/us/en/about/news/2026/a-message-to-our-customers-03-2026.html.
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. CVE-2026-20963 Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability This type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise. Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information. Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. CVE-2025-66376 Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability This type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise. Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information. Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
Even without a navy, or air power, 'They'll still have the ability to hack' Businesses should expect that Iran will conduct more aggressive cyber-ops as the war escalates, according to security analysts.…
Big Tech donates $12.5 million to get things rolling Half a dozen Big Tech players have together delivered $12.5 million in grants towards a project that aims to help maintainers of open source projects to cope with AI slop bug reports.…
In less polite places, this is called ‘hacking back’ or ‘offensive cyber-ops’ Japan’s government yesterday decided to allow its Self-Defense Force to conduct offensive cyber-operations, starting on October 1st.…
Credential theft soared in the second half of 2025, thanks in part to the industrialization of infostealer malware and AI-enabled social engineering.
When technical expertise meets clear communication, cybersecurity teams thrive. Learn how to foster trust and collaboration across diverse working groups.
Ransomware actors are ditching Cobalt Strike in favor of native Windows tools, as payment rates hit record lows and data theft surges.
Sell your soul to the orb Sam Altman has cooked up a plan to make his cryptocurrency/identity/eyeball-scanning-orb venture more useful by – you guessed it – adding agentic AI to the mix. Now the technology behind it will be used to identify the human behind bots.…
In an unsuccessful phishing attack, threat actors leveraged trusted brands and domains to try to redirect a C-suite executive at Outpost24 to give up his credentials.
State-sponsored attackers joined by Chinese snoops and hackers-for-hire in latest round of economic penalties The Council of the European Union sanctioned Emennet Pasargad on Monday, a company used as a front for a series of Iranian cyberattacks.…
In a recent attack, the group showcased stealthier cross-network activity, thanks to its use of a new BYOVD technique and other tools.
View CSAF Summary Schneider Electric is aware of a hard-coded credentials vulnerability in its EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert (DCE) product that requires administrator credentials and enabling a feature (SOCKS Proxy) that is off by default. The EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert product is a scalable monitoring software that collects, organizes, and distributes critical device information providing a comprehensive view of equipment. Failure to apply the remediation provided below may risk information disclosure, and remote compromise of the offer which could result in disruption of operations and access to system data. The following versions of Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Data Center Expert are affected: EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert vers:intdot/<=9.0 EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert 9.1 CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities v3 7.2 Schneider Electric Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Data Center Expert Use of Hard-coded Credentials Background Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Commercial Facilities, Energy, Food and Agriculture, Government Services and Facilities, Transportation Systems Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide Company Headquarters Location: France Vulnerabilities Expand All + CVE-2025-13957 A hard-coded credentials vulnerability exists that could lead to information disclosure and remote code execution when SOCKS Proxy is enabled, and administrator credentials and PostgreSQL database credentials are known. SOCKS Proxy is disabled by default. View CVE Details Affected Products Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Data Center Expert Vendor: Schneider Electric Product Version: EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert (Formerly known as StruxureWare Data Center Expert) v9.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected Remediations Vendor fix v9.1 of EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: https://www.se.com/en/product-range/61851-ecostruxure-it-data-center-expert/#software-and-firmware Mitigation If users choose not to apply the remediation provided above, they should immediately apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of exploit: • Harden the DCE instance according to the cybersecurity best practices documented in the EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert Security Handbook • Ensure the SOCKS Proxy is disabled as in the default configuration. Mitigation For more information see the associated Schneider Electric CPCERT security advisory SEVD-2026-069-05 Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert PDF Version https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2026-069-05&p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice&p_File_Name=SEVD-2026-069-05.pdf Mitigation For more information see the associated Schneider Electric CPCERT security advisory SEVD-2026-069-05 Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert CSAF Version https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2026-069-05&p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice&p_File_Name=sevd-2026-069-05.json Relevant CWE: CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials Metrics CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String 3.1 7.2 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Acknowledgments hassan ali of TrendAI Zero Day Initiative reported this vulnerability to Schneider Electric General Security Recommendations Schneider Electric strongly recommends the following industry cybersecurity best practices: * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the “Program” mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document. For More Information This document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process. For further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric’s products, visit the company’s cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp LEGAL DISCLAIMER THIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS “NOTIFICATION”) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN “AS-IS” BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION About Schneider Electric Schneider's purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and sustainability for all. We call this Life Is On. Our mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency. We are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart industries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep domain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation, software and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers. We are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries to ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our meaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all. www.se.com Legal Notice and Terms of Use This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy). Recommended Practices CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet. Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks. When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies. Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents. Advisory Conversion Disclaimer This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-069-05 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory. Revision History Initial Release Date: 2026-03-10 Date Revision Summary 2026-03-10 1 Original Release 2026-03-17 2 Initial CISA Republication of Schneider Electric SEVD-2026-069-05 advisory Legal Notice and Terms of Use
View CSAF Summary Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability in its SCADAPack™ x70 RTU products. The SCADAPack™ 47xi, SCADAPack™ 47x and SCADAPack™ 57x product are Remote Terminal Units that provide communication capabilities for remote monitoring and control. Failure to apply the remediations provided below may risk unauthorized access to your RTU, which could result in the possibility of denial of service and loss of confidentiality, integrity of the controller. The following versions of Schneider Electric SCADAPack and RemoteConnect are affected: SCADAPack™ vers:generic/ SCADAPack™ firmware vers:intdot/<9.12.2, 9.12.2, vers:intdot/<9.12.2, 9.12.2 () RemoteConnect vers:generic/ CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities v3 9.8 Schneider Electric Schneider Electric SCADAPack and RemoteConnect Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Background Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Energy Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide Company Headquarters Location: France Vulnerabilities Expand All + CVE-2026-0667 CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability that could cause arbitrary code execution, denial of service and loss of confidentiality & integrity when communicating over the Modbus TCP protocol. View CVE Details Affected Products Schneider Electric SCADAPack and RemoteConnect Vendor: Schneider Electric Product Version: SCADAPack™ 57x All Versions, RemoteConnect Versions prior to R3.4.2 Product Status: fixed, known_affected Remediations Vendor fix Version R3.4.2 (Firmware version 9.12.2) of SCADAPack™ 47x and SCADAPack™ 47xi includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/RemoteConnect/ Vendor fix Version R3.4.2 of RemoteConnect includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/RemoteConnect/ Mitigation If customers choose not to apply the remediation provided above, they should immediately apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of exploit: Follow the information according to SCADAPack™ Security Guidelines in section 8.3 Secured Communication. Also, apply the following standard practices to reduce the risk of exploit: • Setup network segmentation and implement the RTU firewall service to block all unauthorized access to services • Disable the logic debug service. Mitigation Follow the information according to SCADAPack™ Security Guidelines in section 8.3 Secured Communication. Also, apply the following standard practices to reduce the risk of exploit • Setup network segmentation and implement the RTU firewall service to block all unauthorized access to services. • Disable the logic debug service. Relevant CWE: CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Metrics CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String 3.1 9.8 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Acknowledgments Schneider Electric CPCERT reported this vulnerability to CISA. General Security Recommendations We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices. * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the “Program” mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document. For More Information This document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process. For further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric's products, visit the company's cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp LEGAL DISCLAIMER THIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS “NOTIFICATION”) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN “AS-IS” BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION About Schneider Electric Schneider's purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and sustainability for all. We call this Life Is On. Our mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency. We are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart industries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep domain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation, software and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers. We are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries to ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our meaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all. www.se.com Legal Notice and Terms of Use This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy). Recommended Practices CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet. Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks. When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies. Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents. Advisory Conversion Disclaimer This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-041-01 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory. Revision History Initial Release Date: 2026-02-10 Date Revision Summary 2026-02-10 1 Original Release 2026-03-17 2 Initial CISA Republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-041-01 advisory Legal Notice and Terms of Use